Abstract. Rijndael-like structure is a special case of SPN structure. The linear transformation of Rijndael-like structures consists of linear transformations of two types, the one is byte permutation π and the other is linear transformation θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4), where each of θi separately operates on each of the four columns of a state. Furthermore, π and θ have some interesting properties. In this paper, we present a new method for upper bounding the maximum differential probability and the maximum linear hull probability for Rijndael-like structures. By applying our method to Rijndael, we obtain that the maximum differential probability and the maximum linear hull probability for 4 rounds of Rijndael are bounded by 1.06 × 2 −96 .
Introduction
SPN(Substitution and Permutation Network) structure is one of the most commonly used structure in block ciphers. SPN structure is based on Shannon's principles of confusion and diffusion [4] and these principles are implemented through the use of substitution and linear transformation, respectively.
Rijndael [7] , Crypton [12, 13] and Square [6] are the block ciphers composed of SPN structures. They have a common point for the type of their linear transformations. Each of their linear transformations consists of linear transformations of two types, the one is byte permutation π and the other is linear transformation θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 ), where each of θ i separately operates on each of the four columns of a state. Furthermore, each of bytes of each column of y = π(x) comes from each different column of x, and we can determine the branch number of each of θ i . In this paper, we call such a SPN structure Rijndael-like structure.
The security of SPN structures against differential cryptanalysis [2, 3] and linear cryptanalysis [14] depends on the maximum differential probability and the maximum linear hull probability. In [11] , Keliher et al. proposed a method for finding the upper bound on the maximum average linear hull probability for SPN structures. Application of their method to Rijndael yields an upper bound of 2 −75 when 7 or more rounds are approximated. In [10] , it was proposed that the improved upper bound on the maximum average linear hull probability for Rijndael when 9 or more rounds are approximated is 2 −92 , corresponding to a lower bound on the data complexity of 2 97 . This is based on completion of 43% of the computation. It is estimated that the running time to completion is 200,000 hours on a single Sun Ultra 5.
In this paper, we present a new method for upper bounding the maximum differential probability and the maximum linear hull probability for Rijndaellike structures. We prove that the maximum differential probability for 4 rounds of Rijndael-like structures is bounded by 4p
19 + 6p 18 + 4p 17 + p 16 , when the maximum differential probability for S-boxes is p(≤ 2 −3 ). Also, we prove that the maximum linear hull probability for 4 rounds of Rijndael-like structures is bounded by 4q
19 + 6q 18 + 4q 17 + q 16 , when the maximum linear hull probability for S-boxes is q(≤ 2 −3 ). By applying our method to Rijndael, we obtain that the maximum differential probability and the maximum linear hull probability for 4 rounds of Rijndael are bounded by 1.06 × 2 −96 .
SPN structures
One round of SPN structures generally consists of three layers of key addition, substitution, and linear transformation. On the key addition layer, round subkeys and round input values are exclusive-ored. Substitution layer is made up of n small nonlinear substitutions referred to as S-boxes, and linear transformation layer is a linear transformation in order to diffuse the cryptographic characteristics of substitution layer. A typical example of one round of SPN structures is given in Figure 1 . On r rounds of SPN structures, the linear transformation of the last round, generally, is omitted, because it has no cryptographic significance. Therefore, 2 rounds of SPN structures is given in Figure 2 .
S-boxes and linear transformations should be invertible in order to decipher. Therefore we assume that all S-boxes are bijections from Z m 2 to itself. Moreover, throughout this paper, we assume that round subkeys are independent and uniformly distributed. Let S be an S-box with m input and output bits. Differential and linear probability of S are defined as the following definition:
respectively, where x · y denotes the parity(0 or 1) of bitwise product of x and y.
a and b are called as input and output differences, respectively. Also, Γ a and Γ b are called as input and output mask values, respectively.
The strength of an S-box S against differential cryptanalysis is decided by maximum differential probability max a =0,b DP S (a, b). The strength of an Sbox S against linear cryptanalysis is decided by maximum linear probability
Definition 2. The maximum differential probability p and the maximum linear probability q of S are defined by
respectively.
The maximum differential probability p and the maximum linear probability q for a strong S-box S should be small enough for any input difference a = 0 and any output mask value Γ b = 0. Definition 3. Differentially active S-box is defined as an S-box given a non-zero input difference and linearly active S-box is defined as an S-box given a nonzero output mask value.
Since all S-boxes in substitution layer are bijective, if an S-box is differentially/linearly active, then it has a non-zero output difference/input mask value.
For SPN structures, between the differential probability and the number of differentially active S-boxes, there is a relationship which is close. When the number of differentially active S-boxes is many, the differential probability comes to be small, and when the number of differentially active S-boxes is small, the differential probability comes to be big. Therefore, the concept of the branch number was proposed [6] . We call it the branch number from the viewpoint of differential cryptanalysis, the minimum number of differentially active S-boxes of 2 rounds of SPN structures. Also, we call it the branch number from the viewpoint of linear cryptanalysis, the minimum number of linearly active S-boxes of 2 rounds of SPN structures.
The linear transformation
n and the addition is bitwise exclusive-ored. For the block cipher E2 [15] and Camellia [1] , m ij ∈ Z 2 and the multiplication is trivial. For the block cipher Crypton [12, 13] , m ij ∈ Z m 2 and the multiplication is the bitwise logical-and operation. For the block cipher Rijndael [7] , m ij ∈ GF (2 m ) and the multiplication is defined as the multiplication over 
Throughout this paper, we define wt(x) = wt(
. Therefore, we can define the branch number β l from the view point of linear cryptanalysis as follows:
Rijndael-like structures
Rijndael is the block cipher composed of SPN structures and its linear transformation consists of ShiftRows transformation and MixColumns transformation.
We analyze some interesting properties of ShiftRows transformation and Mixcolumns transformation of Rijndael.
16 be the ShiftRows transformation of Rijndael. Let x = (x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,x 4 ) = (x 11 ,x 12 ,x 13 ,x 14 , x 21 , . . ., x 34 , x 41 ,x 42 ,x 43 ,x 44 ) be the input of π. Figure 3 and 4 illustrate the ShiftRows transformation π of Rijndael. Let y = (y 1 ,y 2 ,y 3 ,y 4 ) = (y 11 ,y 12 ,y 13 ,y 14 , y 21 , . . ., y 34 , y 41 ,y 42 ,y 43 ,y 44 ) be the output of π. It is easy to know that, for any i(i = 1, 2, 3, 4), each of bytes of y i comes from each different x i . For example, for y 1 = (y 11 , y 12 , y 13 , y 14 ) = (x 11 , x 22 , x 33 , x 44 ), x 11 is a byte coming from x 1 . Furthermore, x 22 , x 33 and x 44 are elements of x 2 , x 3 and x 4 , respectively.
The MixColumns transformation of Rijndael operates on the state column by column, treating each column as a four-term polynomial. Let θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 ) be the MixColumns transformation of Rijndael. Let y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) = (y 11 , y 12 , y 13 , y 14 , y 21 , . . ., y 34 , y 41 ,y 42 ,y 43 ,y 44 ) be the input of θ and z = (z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ,z 4 ) = (z 11 ,z 12 ,z 13 ,z 14 , z 21 , . . ., z 34 , z 41 ,z 42 ,z 43 ,z 44 ) be the output of θ, respectively. Each of θ i can be written as a matrix multiplication as follows: 
In the matrix multiplication, the addition is bitwise exclusive-ored and the multiplication is defined as the multiplication over GF (2 8 ). Figure 5 illustrates 
(ii) (The condition of π) Each of bytes of y i comes from each different x i , where x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) is input of π and y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) is output of π, respectively. (iii) (The condition of θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 )) When we consider each of θ i as a linear transformation, the followings hold:
Rijndael, Square and Crypton are examples of Rijndael-like structures.
Definition 6. For x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), the pattern of x, γ x , is defined by γ x = (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) ∈ Z n 2 , where, if x i = 0, then γ i = 0, and if
, where x 1 = 0, x 2 = 0 and x 3 = x 4 = 0, then γ x = (1, 1, 0, 0). Definition 7. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) be the input of π and y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) be the output of π, respectively. For arbitrary γ ∈ Z 4 2 and u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 ) ∈ Z 4 , We define N [γ, u] as following: 
. (1, 1, 1, 0) , (4, 1, 0, 0)] = 0. -N [(1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 0) 
4 The upper bound on the differential and the linear hull probabilities for Rijndael-like structures
To compute the upper bound on the maximum differential probability for r(r ≥ 2) rounds of Rijndael-like structures, we assume the following: -DP r (a, b): differential probability of r rounds whose input difference is a and output difference is b.
12 , x When the branch number is n or n + 1, it is known that the upper bounds of the maximum differential probability and the linear hull probability for 2 rounds of SPN structures are as follows:
The upper bound on the maximum differential probability for 2 rounds of Rijndael-like structures is obtained by Lemma 1.
where, DP θi 2 is the differential probability of 2 rounds of SPN structure whose linear transformation is θ i . By Lemma 1, we know that the upper bound on DP θi 2 (a * i , b i ) is the followings:
Therefore, the proof is completed.
By Theorem 1, the upper bound on the maximum differential probability for 2 rounds of Rijndael-like structures is p β d −1 . By applying Theorem 1 to Rijndael, we obtain that the maximum differential probability for 2 rounds of Rijndael is bounded by 2 −24 , because β d = 5, p = 2 −6 . Now, we compute the upper bound on the maximum differential probability for 3 rounds of Rijndael-like structures. To do this, we prove the following: n with wt(γ)+wt(b) ≥ β d , we define the set A as following:
Then, the following holds:
Proof. Since y∈A DP 1 (y, b) ≤ y∈(Z m 2 ) n DP 1 (y, b) = 1, it is sufficient to consider the case β d − wt(γ) − 1 > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that wt(b) = k and
We proceed the proof with two cases: wt 
is equal to zero. This is a contradiction of the definition of branch number. Therefore, we can establish the following:
(Case 2: wt(γ) + wt(b) > β d ). In this case, y i,1 , y i,2 , . . . , y i,δ are not necessarily distinct, We fix t = k + wt(γ) − β d components of nonzero components of y, i.e., y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y t . Then, all possible values of each of another components(y t+1 , . . . , y k ) are distinct. Therefore, we can establish the following:
where, each of u i (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) is the following:
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that t 1 = 1, . . . , t k = k. By Theorem 1,
2 ), θ 3 (y
3 ), θ 4 (y
4 )). Furthermore, the following three conditions hold:
are the nonzero input and nonzero output of θ i , respectively, we know that wt(y 2) ), we can establish the following equation: (a) ). For (γ 1 , . . . , γ 4 ) which satisfies that if 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then wt(γ i ) = j i and if k+1 ≤ i ≤ 4, then wt(γ i ) = 0, we define the set A (γ1,...,γ4) as following:
4 )|γ y
where, z (2) satisfies the three conditions (i), (ii) and (iii). The set A (γ1,...,γ4) can be empty set, but, the number of non-empty set A (γ1,...,γ4) is not empty set, by Lemma 2,
Therefore,
To derive the upper bound on the maximum differential probability for 4 rounds of Rijndael-like structures, we prove the following three lemmas:
19 +6p 18 +4p 17 +p 16 .
Proof. We assume that γ b = (1, 1, 1, 0) . Then we can represent DP 4 (a, b) as following:
We know that wt(y
is nonzero component of x (3) . Now, we compute the value of I. We can represent I as following:
At first, we compute the value of I 1 . Since wt(x
1 ) = 3, by Theorem 2,
Since wt(x
1 ) = 3 and γ b = (1, 1, 1, 0), the number of patterns, (y
1 , y
2 , y 
By applying the same method, it can be determined that the upper bounds of I 2 , I 3 and I 4 are the same with that of I 1 . Therefore, we arrive at I ≤ 4p 19 . Furthermore, using the same method, we have that II ≤ 6p 18 and III ≤ 4p 17 . At last, the upper bound on IV can be computed by Theorem 1 as follows:
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3 and is omitted.
Proof. We assume that γ b = (1, 1, 1, 0). Then we can represent DP 4 (a, b) as following:
We know that wt(y (2) i ) ≤ wt(x (2) ) = wt(γ π(a) ) = 3 and wt(z
is nonzero component of x (3) . Now, we compute the value of I. We can represent I as follows:
At first, we compute the value of I 1 . Since
1 = 0, then wt(x (3) 1 ) = 3. Therefore, using the same method as in Lemma 3, we know that I 1 ≤ p 22 and I ≤ 4p 22 . Secondly, we compute the value of II. For γ x (3) = (1, 1, 0, 0), we have the following:
2 )=j
2 ) = 2, by Theorem 2,
2 )=2
1 ) = 2, wt(x
2 ) = 2 and γ b = (1, 1, 0, 0), the number of pattern whose form is (z ≤ p 12−(wt(γ1)+wt(γ2)+wt(γ3)) = p 8 .
Therefore, wt(x
1 )=2,wt(x
2 )=2 DP 1 (z (3) , b) ≤ 6p 8 and we arrive at the following:
wt(x
2 )=2 DP 3 (a, x (3) )DP 1 (z (3) , b)
2 )=2 DP 3 (a, x (3) )
Using the same method, we can have the followings:
2 )=3 Therefore, the proof is completed.
Theorem 3 shows the upper bound on the maximal differential probability for 4 rounds of Rijndael-like structures and this is the main result of this paper. Proof. We compute the upper bound on DP 4 (a, b) for the value of wt(γ π(a) ) and wt(b). Since β d = 5, if wt(γ π(a) ) + wt(b) ≤ 4, then DP 4 (a, b) = 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to compute the upper bound on DP 4 (a, b), when wt(γ π(a) )+wt(b) ≥ 5.
(i) If wt(γ π(a) ) = 4, then, by Theorem 1,
DP 2 (a, x (2) ) ≤ p 16 .
(ii) If wt(b) = 4, then, by Theorem 1,
DP 2 (a, x (2) )DP 2 (z (2) , b) ≤ max 
